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Hierarchical games (cooperative version)
Hierarchical systems with double subordination are called
diamond-shaped. Control of a double subordination division C depends
on control B1 and control B2.
One can envision a situation in which center B1 represents the interests
of an industry, while B2 represents regional interests, including the issues
of environment protection. A simple diamond-shaped system is an
example of a hierarchical two-level decision-making system. At the upper
level there is an administrative center which is in charge of material and
labor resources. It brings an influence to bear upon activities of its two
subordinate centers belonging to the next level. The decisions made by
these centers determine an output of the enterprise standing at a lower
level of the hierarchical system.
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Hierarchical games (cooperative version)
We shall consider this decision-making process as a four-person game.
Denote this game by Γ. Going to the game setting, we assume that at
the first step Player A0 moves and selects an element (strategy)
u = (u1, u2) from a certain set U , where U is a strategy set for Player
A0. The element u ∈ U restricts the possibilities for players B1 and B2 to
make their choices at the next step. In other words, the set of choices for
Player B1 is function of the parameter u1 (denoted by B1(u1)). Similarly,
the set of choices for Player B2 is function of parameter u2 (denoted by
B2(u2)). Denote by ω1 ∈ B1(u1) and ω2 ∈ B2(u2) the elements of the
sets of choices for players B1 and B2 respectively. The parameters ω1 and
ω2 selected by players B1 and B2 specify restrictions on the set of choices
for Player C at the third step of the game, i.e. this set turns out to be
the function of parameters ω1 and ω2. Denote it by C (ω1, ω2), and the
elements of this set (production programs) by v .
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Hierarchical games (cooperative version)
Suppose the payoffs of all players A0, B1, B2, C depend only on the
production program v selected by Player C and are respectively equal to
l1(v), l2(v), l3(v), l4(v), where li(v) ≥ 0.
This hierarchical game can be represented as a noncooperative
four-person game in normal form if the strategies for Player A0 are taken
to be the elements u = (u1, u2) ∈ U , while the strategies for players
B1,B2 and C are taken to be the functions ω1(u1), ω2(u2) and v(ω1, ω2)
with values in the sets B1(u1),B2(u2),C (ω1, ω2), respectively, (the sets
of such functions will be denoted by B1,B2,C ) which set up a
correspondence between every possible choice by the player (or the
players) standing at a higher level and the choice made by this player.
Setting
Ki (u, ω1(·), ω2(·), v(·)) = li (v(ω1(u1), ω2(u2)), i = 1, 4
we obtain the normal form of the game Γ
Γ = (U ,B1,B2,C ,K1,K2,K3,K4).
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Multistage games with incomplete information
We considered multistage games with perfect information defined in
terms of a finite tree graph G = (X ,F ) in which each of the players
exactly knows at his move the position or the tree node where he stays.
That is why we were able to introduce the notion of player i ’s strategy as
a single-valued function ui(x) defined on the set of personal positions Xi
with its values in the set Fx . If, however, we wish to study a multistage
game in which the players making their choices have no exact knowledge
of positions in which they make their moves or may merely speculate that
this position belongs to some subset A of personal positions Xi , then the
realization of player’s strategy as a function of position x ∈ Xi turns out
to be impossible. In this manner the wish to complicate the information
structure of a game inevitably involves changes in the notion of a
strategy. In order to provide exact formulations, we should first formalize
the notion of information in the game. Here the notion of an information
set plays an important role. This will be illustrated with some simple,
already classical examples from texts on game theory.
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Zero-sum game
Example 1. Player 1 selects at the first move a number from the set
{1, 2}. The second move is made by Player 2. He is informed about
Player 1’s choice and selects a number from the set {1, 2}. The third
move is again to be made by Player 1. He knows Player 2’s choice,
remembers his own choice and selects a number from the set {1, 2}. At
this point the game terminates and Player 1 receives a payoff H (Player 2
receives a payoff (−H), i.e. the game is zero-sum), where the function H
is defined as follows:
H(1, 1, 1) = −3, H(2, 1, 1) = 4,
H(1, 1, 2) = −2, H(2, 1, 2) = 1,
H(1, 2, 1) = 2, H(2, 2, 1) = 1,
H(1, 2, 2) = −5, H(2, 2, 2) = 5,
The graph G = (X ,F ) of the game is depicted in Figure. The circles in
the graph represent positions in which Player 1 makes a move, whereas
the blocks represent positions in which Player 2 makes a move.
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Zero-sum game
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Zero-sum game
If the set X1 is denoted by X , the set X2 by Y and the elements of these
sets by x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , respectively, then Player 1’s strategy u1(·) is given
by the five-dimensional vector
u1(·) = {u1(x1), u1(x2), u1(x3), u1(x4), u1(x5)} prescribing the choice of
one of the two numbers {1, 2} in each position of the set X . Similarly,
Player 2’s strategy u2(·) is a two-dimensional vector
u2(·) = {u2(y1), u2(y2)} prescribing the choice of one of the two numbers
{1, 2} in each of the positions of the set Y . Now, in this game Player 1
has 32 strategies and Player 2 has 4 strategies. The corresponding
normal form of the game has a 32×4 matrix which has an equilibrium in
pure strategies. It can be seen that the value of this game is 4. Player 1
has four optimal pure strategies: (2,1,1,1,2), (2,1,2,1,2), (2,2,1,1,2),
(2,2,2,1,2). Player 2 has two optimal strategies: (1,1), (2,1).
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Multistage games with incomplete information
Example 2. Player 1 chooses a number from the set {1, 2} on the first
move. The second move is made by Player 2 without being informed
about Player 1’s choice. Further, on the third move Player 1 chooses a
number from the set {1, 2} without knowing Player 2’s choice and with
no memory of his own choice at the first step.
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Multistage games with incomplete information
Here the strategy of Player 1 consists of a pair of numbers (i , j), the i-th
choice is at the first step, and j-th choice is at the third step; the
strategy of Player 2 is a choice of number j at the second step of the
game. Now, Player 1 has four strategies and Player 2 has two strategies.
The game in normal form has a 4× 2 matrix:
(1.1)
(1.2)
(2.1)
(2.2)
1 2

−3
−2
4
1
2
−5
1
5

 .
The value of the game is 19/7, an optimal mixed strategy for Player 1 is
(0, 0, 4/7, 3/7), whereas an optimal strategy for Player 2 is (4/7, 3/7).
In this game the value is found to be the same as in Example 8, i.e. it
turns out that the deterioration of information conditions for Player 2 did
not improve the state of Player 1. This condition is random in nature and
is accountable to special features of the payoff function.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
In what follows as basic model we shall consider the game in extensive
form with perfect information.
Suppose that finite oriented treelike graph G with the root x0 is given.
For simplicity we shall use the following notations. Let x be some vertex
(position). We denote by G(x) a subtree of G with root in x . We denote
by Z (x) immediate successors of x. As before the vertices y , directly
following after x, are called alternatives in x (y ∈ Z (x)). The player who
makes a decision in x (who selects the next alterative position in x), will
be denoted by i(x). The choice of player i(x) in position x will be
denoted by x¯ ∈ Z (x).
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Definition 1
A game in extensive form with perfect information (see []) Γ(x0) is a
graph tree G(x0), with the following additional properties:
1 The set of vertices (positions) is split up into n + 1 subsets
X1,X2, . . . ,Xn+1, which form a partition of the set of all vertices of
the graph tree G(x0). The vertices (positions) x ∈ Xi are called
players i personal positions, i = 1, · · · , n; vertices (positions)
x ∈ Xn+1 are called terminal positions.
2 For each vertex x /∈ Xn+1 and y ∈ Z (x) define an arc (x,y) on the
graph G(x0). On each arc (x , y) n real numbers (payoffs of players
on this arc) hi (x , y), i = 1, . . . , n, hi ≥ 0 are defined, and also
terminal payoffs gi (x) ≥ 0, for x ∈ Xn+1 , i = 1, . . . , n.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Definition 2
A strategy of player i is a mapping Ui (·), which associate to each
position x ∈ Xi a unique alternative y ∈ Z (x).
Denote by Hi(x ; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function of player i ∈ N in
the subgame Γ(x) starting from the position x .
Hi (x ; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
l−1∑
k=0
hi (xk , xk+1) + gi (xl), hi ≥ 0, gi ≥ 0
where xl ∈ Xn+1 is the last vertex (position) in the path
x˜ = (x0, x1, . . . , xl ) realized in subgame Γ(x), and x0 = x , when n-tuple
of strategies (u1(·), . . . , un(·)) is played.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Denote by u¯(·) = (u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) the n-tuple of strategies and the
trajectory (path) x¯ = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯l), x¯l ∈ Pn+1 such that
max
u1(·),...,un(·)
n∑
i=1
Hi(x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
n∑
i=1
Hi(x0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) =
n∑
i=1
(
l−1∑
k=0
hi (x¯k , x¯k+1) + gi (x¯l)
)
. (1)
The path x¯ = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯l) satisfying (1) we shall call “optimal
cooperative trajectory”.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Define in Γ(x0) characteristic function in a classical way
V (x0;N) =
n∑
i=1
(
l−1∑
k=0
hi (x¯k , x¯k+1) + gi (x¯l)
)
,
V (x0; ∅) = 0,
V (x0; S) = ValΓS,N\S(x0),
where ValΓS,N\S(x0) is a value of zero-sum game played between
coalition S acting as first player and coalition N \ S acting as player 2,
with payoff of player S equal to∑
i∈S
Hi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)).
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
If the characteristic function is defined then we can define the set of
imputations in the game Γ(x0)
C (x0) =
{
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) : ξi ≥ V (x0; {i}),
∑
i∈N
ξi = V (x0;N)
}
,
the core M(x0) ⊂ C (x0)
M(x0) =
{
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) :
∑
i∈S
ξi ≥ V (x0; S), S ⊂ N
}
⊂ C (x0),
NM solution, Shapley value and other optimality principles of classical
game theory. In what follows we shall denote by M(x0) ⊂ C (x0) anyone
of this optimality principles.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Suppose at the beginning of the game players agree to use the optimality
principle M(x0) ⊂ C (x0) as the basis for the selection of the ”optimal”
imputation ξ¯ ∈ M(x0).
This means that playing cooperatively by choosing the strategy
maximizing the common payoff each one of them is waiting to get the
payoff ξ¯i from the optimal imputation ξ¯ ∈ M(x0) after the end of the
game (after the maximal common payoff V (x0;N) is really earned by the
players).
But when the game Γ actually develops along the “optimal” trajectory
x¯ = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯l ) at each vertex x¯k the players find themselves in the
new multistage game with perfect information Γx¯k , k = 0, . . . , l , which is
the subgame of the original game Γ starting from x¯k with payoffs
Hi (x¯k ; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
l−1∑
j=k
hi (xj , xj+1) + gi(xl ), i = 1, . . . , n.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
It is important to mention that for the problem (1) the Bellman
optimality principle holds and the part x¯k = (x¯k , . . . , x¯j , . . . , x¯l) of the
trajectory x¯ , starting from x¯k maximizes the sum of the payoffs in the
subgame Γx¯k , i.e.
max
xk ,...,xj ,...,xl
n∑
i=1

 l−1∑
j=k
hi(xj , xj+1) + gi(xl )

 = n∑
i=1

 l−1∑
j=k
hi(x¯j , x¯j+1) + gi(x¯l )

 ,
which means that the trajectory x¯k = (x¯k , . . . , x¯j , . . . , x¯l) is also
“optimal” in the subgame Γx¯k .
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Before entering the subgame Γx¯k each of the players i have already earned the
amount
H
x¯k
i =
k−1∑
j=0
hi(x¯j , x¯j+1).
At the same time at the beginning of the game Γ = Γ(x0) the player i was
oriented to get the payoff ξ¯i – the ith component of the “optimal” imputation
ξ¯ ∈ M(x0) ⊂ C(x0). From this it follows that in the subgame Γx¯k he is
expected to get the payoff equal to
ξ¯i − H
x¯k
i = ξ¯
x¯k
i , i = 1, . . . , n
and then the question arises whether the new vector
ξ¯x¯k = (ξ¯x¯k1 , . . . , ξ¯
x¯k
i , . . . , ξ¯
x¯k
n ) remains to be optimal in the same sense in the
subgame Γx¯k as the vector ξ¯ was in the game Γ(x¯0). If this will not be the case,
it will mean that the players in the subgame Γx¯k will not orient themselves on
the same optimality principle as in the game Γ(x¯0) which may enforce them to
go out from the cooperation by changing the chosen cooperative strategies
u¯i (·), i = 1, . . . , n and thus changing the optimal trajectory x¯ in the subgame
Γ(x¯k). Try now formalize this reasoning.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Introduce in the subgame Γ(x¯k ), k = 1, . . . , l , the characteristic function
V (x¯k ; S), S ⊂ N in the same manner as it was done in the game
Γ = Γ(x0). Based on the characteristic function V (x¯k ; S) we can
introduce the set of imputations
C (x¯k ) =
{
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) : ξi ≥ V (x¯k ; {i}),
∑
i∈N
ξi = V (x¯k ;N)
}
,
the core M(x¯k) ⊂ C (x¯k)
M(x¯k) =
{
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) :
∑
i∈S
ξi ≥ V (x¯k ; S), S ⊂ N
}
⊂ C (x¯k),
NM solution, Shapley value and other optimality principles of classical
game theory. Denote by M(x¯k) ⊂ C (x¯k ) the optimality principle M ⊂ C
(which was selected by players in the game Γ(x0)) considered in the
subgame Γ(x¯k).
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
If we suppose that the players in the game Γ(x0) when moving along the
optimal trajectory (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯l) follow the same ideology of optimal
behaviour then the vector ξ¯x¯k = ξ¯ − H x¯k must belong to the set M(x¯k) –
the corresponding optimality principle in the cooperative game Γ(x¯k),
k = 0, . . . , l .
It is clearly seen that it is very difficult to find games and corresponding
optimality principles for which this condition is satisfied. Try to illustrate
this on the following example.
Suppose that in the game Γ hi (xk , xk+1) = 0, k = 0, . . . , l − 1,
gi(xl ) 6= 0 (the game Γ is the game with terminal payoff). Then the last
condition would mean that
ξ¯ = ξ¯x¯k ∈ M(x¯k), k = 0, . . . , l ,
which gives us
ξ¯ ∈
l⋂
k=0
M(x¯k). (2)
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
For k = l we shall have that
ξ¯ ∈ M(x¯l).
But M(x¯l ) = C(x¯l) = {gi (x¯l )}. And this condition have to be valid for all
imputations of the set M(x¯0) and for all optimality principles M(x0) ⊂ C(x0),
which means that in the cooperative game with terminal payoffs the only
reasonable optimality principle will be
ξ¯ = {gi (x¯l)},
the payoff vector obtained at the end point of the cooperative trajectory in the
game Γ(x0). At the same time the simplest examples show that the intersection
(2) except the “dummy” cases, is void for the games with terminal payoffs.
How to overcome this difficulty. The plausible way of finding the outcome is to
introduce a special rule of payments (stage salary) on each stage of the game
in such a way that the payments on each stage will not exceed the common
amount earned by the players on this stage and the payments received by the
players starting from the stage k(in the subgame Γ(x¯k)) will belong to the same
optimality principle as the imputation ξ¯ on which players agree in the game
Γ(x0) at the beginning of the game. Whether it is possible or not we shall
consider now.
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Introduce the notion of the imputation distribution procedure (IDP).
Definition 3
Suppose that ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξi , . . . , ξn} ∈ M(x0). Any matrix β = {βik},
i = 1, . . . , n, k = 0, . . . , n such that
ξi =
l∑
k=0
βik , (3)
is called the imputation distribution procedure (IDP).
Denote βk = (β1k , . . . , βnk), β(k) =
k−1∑
m=0
βm. The interpretation of IDP β is: βik
is the payment to player i on the stage k of the game Γx0 , i.e. on the first
stage of the subgame Γ(x¯k). From the definition (3) it follows that in the game
Γ(x0) each player i gets the amount ξi , i = 1, . . . , n, which he expects to get as
the ith component of the optimal imputation ξi ∈ M(x0) in the game Γ(x0).
The interpretation of βi (k) is: βi (k) is the amount received by player i on the
first k stages of the game Γx0 .
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
Definition 4
The optimality principle M(x0) is called time-consistent if for every ξ ∈ M(x0)
there exists IDP β such that
ξ
k = ξ − β(k) ∈ M(x¯k ), k = 0, 1, . . . , l . (4)
Definition 5
The optimality principle M(x0) is called strongly time-consistent if for every
ξ ∈ M(x0) there exists IDP β such that
β(k)⊕M(x¯k) ⊂ M(x0), k = 0, 1, . . . , l .
Here a⊕ A = {a + a′ : a′ ∈ A, a ∈ Rn,A ⊂ Rn}.
The time-consistency of the optimality principle M(x0) implies that for each
imputation ξ ∈ M there exits such IDP β that if the payments on each arc
(x¯k , x¯k+1) on the optimal trajectory x¯ will be made to the players according to
IDP β, in every subgame Γ(x¯k ) the players may expect to receive the payments
ξ¯k which are optimal in the subgame Γ(x¯k) in the same sense as it was in the
game Γ(x0).
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
The strongly time-consistency means that if the payments are made
according to IDP β then after earning on the stage k amount β(k) the
players (if they are oriented in the subgame Γ(x¯k) on the same optimality
principle as in Γ(x0)) start with reconsidering of the imputation in this
subgame (but optimal) they will get as a result in the game Γ(x0) the
payments according to some imputation, optimal in the previous sense,
i.e. the imputation belonging to the set M(x0).
For any optimality principle M(x0) ⊂ C (x0) and for every ξ¯ ∈ M(x0) we
can define βik by the following formulas
ξ¯x¯ki − ξ¯
x¯k+1
i = βik , i = 1, . . . , n, k = 0, . . . , l − 1,
ξ¯x¯li = βil . (5)
From the definition it follows that
l∑
k=0
βik =
l−1∑
k=0
(ξ¯x¯ki − ξ¯
x¯k+1
i ) + ξ¯
x¯l
i = ξ¯
x¯0
i = ξ¯i .
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Cooperative multistage games with perfect information
And at the same time
ξ¯ − β(k) = ξ¯x¯k ∈ M(x¯k), k = 0, . . . , l .
The last inclusion would mean the time consistency M(x0).
Unfortunately the elements βik may take in many cases negative values,
which may stimulate questions about the use of this payment mechanism
in real life situations. Because this means that players in some cases have
to pay to support time–consistency. We understand that this argument
can be waved since the total amount the player gets in the game is equal
to the component ξi of the optimal imputation, and he can borrow the
money to cover the side payment βik on stage k .
But we have another approach which enables us to use only nonnegative
IDP’s, and get us result not only time-consistent, but strongly
time-consistent solution. For this reason some integral transformation of
characteristic function is needed.
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Time inconsistency of the Shapley Value
Example 3. . Consider the cooperative version of the game on the Figure, in
the case when there are only 3 players. The following coalitions are possible
{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1}, {2}, {3}. The characteristic function has
the form v({1, 2, 3}) = 6, v({1, 2}) = 2, v({1, 3}) = 2, v({2, 3}) = 2,
v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 1
2
, v({3}) = 1
2
. Computing the Shapley Value we get
Sh(x0) : Sh1 =
26
12
, Sh2 =
23
12
, Sh3 =
23
12
.
Suppose the game develops along the optimal cooperative trajectory, which
corresponds to the choices (A, A, A), and coincides with the path
x¯ = (x0, x1, x2, x3). As we have seen v(x0; {1, 2, 3}) = 6,
v(x0; {1, 2})= v(x0; {1, 3}) =v(x0; {2, 3}) = 2, v(x0; {1}) = 1,
v(x0; {2}) =v(x0; {3}) =
1
2
. Consider now the subgame starting on cooperative
trajectory from vertex x¯1. It can be easily seen that v(x¯1; {1, 2, 3}) = 6,
v(x¯1; {1, 2}) = 1, v(x¯1; {1, 3}) = 1, v(x¯1; {2, 3}) = 4, v(x¯1; {1}) =
1
3
,
v(x¯1; {2}) =
1
2
, v(x¯1; {3}) =
1
2
. And the Shapley Value in the subgame Γ(x¯1) is
equal to
Sh(x¯1) =
(
34
36
,
91
36
,
91
36
)
,
and we see that Sh(x0) 6= Sh(x¯1).
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Time inconsistency of the Shapley Value
Consider now the subgame starting on cooperative trajectory from vertex
x¯2. It can be easily seen that v(x¯2; {1, 2, 3}) = 6, v(x¯2; {1, 2}) = 1,
v(x¯2; {1, 3}) = 1, v(x¯2; {2, 3}) = 4, v(x¯2; {1}) =
1
3 , v(x¯2; {2}) =
1
2 ,
v(x¯2; {3}) =
1
2 . And the Shapley Value in the subgame Γ(x¯2) is equal to
Sh(x¯2) =
(
21
18
,
21
18
,
66
18
)
,
and we see that Sh(x¯0) 6= Sh(x¯1) 6= Sh(x¯2). It is obvious that
Sh(x¯3) = (2, 2, 2).
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Time inconsistency of the Shapley Value
IPD for Shapley Value in this game can be easily calculated
Sh(0) =
(
44
36
, −
22
36
, −
22
36
)
+ Sh(1),
Sh(1) =
(
−
8
36
,
49
36
, −
41
36
)
+ Sh(2),
Sh(2) =
(
−
15
18
, −
15
18
,
30
18
)
+ Sh(3),
Sh(3) = (2, 2, 2).
The strongly time consistency condition is more obligatory. We cannot
even derive the formula like (5).
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